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12WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
SURETYSHIP, GUARANTY AND INDEMNITY-DISTINCTIONS.-
What is the distinction between a contract of suretyship, a
contract of guaranty, and a contract of indemnity?
To say that the distinction between a contract of surety-
ship and one of guaranty is a shadowy one and that the
words "surety" and "guarantor" are often used indiscrimin-
ately as synonymous terms is to state a well known fact. In
a broad. sense a contract of guaranty corresponds with that
of suretyship, the distinction between them being merely
technical, and a transaction which is called in some cases
an absolute guaranty is denominated by other courts a con-
tract of suretyship. A guaranty is like a suretyship in the
sense that it is an engagement to answer for the debt, default
or miscarriage of another and it is for this reason that the
terms "surety" and "guarantor" or "guaranty" are often
confounded and used interchangeably.' Yet there are points
of difference between them which should be carefully
noted. A surety is usually bound with his principal by the
same instrument, executed at the same time and on the
same consideration. He is an original promisor and debtor
from the beginning, and is held ordinarily to know every
default of his principal. Usually the surety will not be
discharged, either by the mere indulgence of the creditor to
the principal, or by want of notice of the default of the
principal, no matter how much he may be injured thereby.
On the other hand, the contract of the guarantor is his own
separate undertaking, in which the principal does not join.
It is usually entered into before or after that of the princi-
pal and is often founded on a separate consideration from
that supporting the contract of the principal. The original
contract of the principal is not the guarantor's contract,
and the guarantor is not bound to take notice of its non-
performance. The guarantor is often discharged by the
mere indulgence of the creditor to the principal, and is
usually not liable unless notified of the default of the prin-
cipal. 2 One instance of the disagreement of the courts
with respect to the characteristic features of these contracts
which are relied on as distinguishing features is the em-
phatic differences of opinion as to the requirement of notice
to the guarantor of the default of the principal. The court
1 28 C. J. 890, §5 and cases cited.
2 1 BRANDT, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY, 3rd Ed., §2.
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in an Indiana case3 said: "There is considerable loose
writing in the text books upon the subjects of guaranty and
suretyship. Sometimes the two things are confounded
throughout, and the terms used interchangeably, as signi-
fying the same thing. This has introduced some confu-
sion in the cases, so that there are dicta, and-even decisions,
to the effect that, to fix the liability of a guarantor, notice of
default of the principal debtor is required, much as in the
case of an indorser of strictly commercial paper."4  The
doctrine of requirement of notice seems to have been ap-
plied mainly in cases of letters of credit and guaranty of
commercial paper; and its soundness has been utterly de-
nied even in that class of cases, in New York and Massa-
chusetts.5
The importance of making the proper distinction between
a surety and a guarantor lies chiefly in this, that a surety
is in the first instance answerable for the debt for which
he makes himself responsible, and his contracts are often
specialties, while a guarantor is only liable when default
is made by the party whose undertaking is guarantied, and
his agreement is one of simple contract. The principal and
surety, being directly and equally bound, may be sued
jointly in the same suit, while the guarantor, being bound
by a separate contract and only collaterally liable, can
not usually be joined in the same suit with the principal.,
The distinction is particularly difficult to make when the
guaranty is absolute as distinguished from a conditional
guaranty. An absolute guaranty is an unconditional un-
dertaking on the part of the guarantor that the debtor
will pay the debt or perform the obligation. A conditional
guaranty imports the happening of some contingency other
than the default of the principal debtor. An absolute
guaranty of payment differs from a conditional guaranty in
that in the first case the liability of the guarantor is fixed
by the failure of the principal debtor to pay at maturity,
8 Mcillan et at. v. Bull's Head Bank, 32 Ind. 11 (1869).
4 Smith v. Bainbridge, 6 Blackf. 12 (1841) ; Douglass v. Reynolds, 7 Pet. (U. S.)
113 (1833) ; Virden v. Ellsworth, 15 Ind. 144 (1860). But see Reynolds v. Douglass, 12
Pet. (U. S.) 497 (1838), for an important modification of the former ruling in the
same case to the effect that "the guarantor of a promissory note, whose name does not
appear on the note, is bound without notice, where the maker of the note was insolvent
at its maturity, unless he can show he has sustained some prejudice by want of notice
of a demand on the maker of the note and notice of non-payment."
Oxford Bank v. Haynes, 8 Pick. (Iass.) 423 (1829) ; Douglass v. Howlan, 24
Wend. (Q. Y.) 35 (1840) ; Smith v. Dann, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 543 (1844).
'Supra, n. 2.
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while in the second the contract is in the nature of a gua-
ranty of collection, no liability being incurred until after,
by the use of due diligence, the guarantee has become un-
able to collect the debt from the principal debtor.7
A very catchy phrase was once written down by some-
body which was made to read: "A surety undertakes to
pay if the debtor does not. A guarantor undertakes to pay
if the debtor can not." Stearns in his text on Suretyship 8
comments on this phrase, saying that it has rythm and
euphony and by its literary excellence seems to have captiv-
ated legal writers and jurists from the very start, but that
the phrase will not stand analysis; that both conditions "if
the debtor does not" and "if the debtor can not" belong to
and are discriptive of the guarantor, and neither one of
the surety. The condition "if the debtor does not" if ap-
plied to the surety, could only mean the surety is not liable
if the debtor does pay, which, of course, imposes no condition,
and is meaningless as a legal expression. There are no
conditions in the contract of the surety other than those
which are in the -principal's contract. The distinction be-
tween absolute and conditional guaranty must not be over-
looked.
In construing contracts of suretyship, in an effort to de-
termine whether they are contracts of suretyship, in the
narrow sense, or contracts of guaranty, the courts have ap-
plied various tests. One test is, whether the contract fixes
time of default on the part of the principal debtor; if it
does not, it is held to be a contract of guaranty, and if it de-
fines the time of default when the surety is to pay or see
the debt paid it is one of suretyship." Some courts have
held that the joint execution of a contract by the principal
and another operates to exclude the idea of a guaranty and
is in all cases a circumstance pointing toward suretyship.10
In some instances courts look to the consideration in order
to determine the nature of the contract. If the considera-
7 12 R., C. L. 1064, §13.
8 STEARNS ON SUREYTYSHip, 3rd Ed., 6. n. 9. The phrase quoted is from Kramph's
Executrix v. Hatz' Executors, 52 Pa. St. 625 (1866), is quoted with approval and was so
held in McIntosh-Huntington Co. v. Reed, 89 Fed. 464 (1898). cited in 28 C. J. 891, n.
49a.
. Homewood People's Bank v. Hpatings, 263 Pa. St. 260, 106 Atl. 308 (1019) ; West-
inghouse Electric Co. v. Wilson, 63 Pa. Super. 294 (1916).
" Saint v. Wheeler, etc. Mfg. Co., 95 Ala. 362, 10 So. 589 (1892) ; but see Shore
p. Iawrence. 68 W. Va. 220, 69 S. E. 791 (1910), in which a contract so executed was
held to be a guaranty.
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tion moves to the one who guaranties the contract of the
debtor, it is a guaranty and not a suretyship.
Statutory definitions of suretyship exist in many states.
For example, one state defines suretyship to be "an acces-
sory promise, by which a person binds himself, for another
already bound, and agrees with the creditor to satisfy the
obligation if the debtor does not."'- Another state, by its
code, defines the contract of suretyship to be a contract
"whereby one obligates himself to pay the debt of another
in consideration of credit or indulgence, or other benefit
given to the principal, the principal remaining bound there-
for. It differs from a guaranty in this, that the considera-
tion of the latter is a benefit flowing to the guarantor."' 2
According to text writers and the courts generally con-
tracts of indemnity are distinguishable from either con-
tracts of suretyship or contracts of guaranty. Contracts of
indemnity are distinguished from those of suretyship in
that in indemnity contracts the engagement is to make good
and save another from loss upon some obligation which he
has incurred or is about to incur to a third person, and is
not, as in suretyship, a promise to one to whom another is
answerable.' 3 Although one of the meanings of. the word
"guaranty" is "indemnity" or "save harmless" and the word
"guaranty" may be used to create an obligation to indem-
nify one against loss, there are important differences be-
tween a contract of guaranty and one of indemnity. A
guaranty being a collateral undertaking presupposes some
contract or transaction as principal thereto, while a con-
tract of indemnity is original and independent, to which
there is no collateral contract and with respect to which
there is no remedy against the third party. Many courts
have stated the distinction between contracts of indemnity
and those of guaranty in precisely the same words as the
distinction between contracts of indemnity and those of
suretyship has been stated.14 It is submitted that a con-
tract of indemnity might be treated as a contract of "double
suretyship," on the theory that the fourth party brought
into the transaction, that is, the party to whom the surety's
promise of indemnity runs, is really a second surety. The
LA. REv. CODE, Art. 8035.
12 GA. Crv. CODi, §2966.
13 31 CYc. 420 and cases cited.
14 28 C. J. 892 and case cited.
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necessity for making the distinction between contracts of
indemnity and those of suretyship and guaranty arises most
frequently in connection with a plea by the indemnitor of
the Statute of Frauds. The general rule is that a contract
of indemnity, not being a promise to answer for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another, is not within the Statute
of Frauds.15
There are apparently very few West Virginia cases di-
rectly in point, and the expressions in them, like those of
other courts, are unenlightening. A Virginia case, decided
before the separation, defined the obligation of a surety as
follows: "The obligation of a surety is not conditional, but
absolute. His undertaking to pay is not in the event of the
inability or unwillingness of the principal, but at all events
and under all circumstances, as much .o as if he were him-
self the sole debtor."1 6  In what seems to be the earliest
case in West Virginia in which the court was called upon to
distinguish between a contract of suretyship and one of
guaranty, it was held that "the contract of a guarantor is
collateral and secondary; that of a surety is direct. The
guarantor contracts to pay if, by the use of due diligence,
the debt cannot be made out of the principal debtor, while
the surety undertakes directly for the payment, and so is
responsible at once if the principal debtor makes default."' 7
When analyzed this holding seems merely to be a different
way of using the "catchy phrase" referred to above, name-
ly, "that a surety is one who pays if the debtor does not, a
guarantor one who pays if the debtor cannot." If this is
true, it is submitted that the court is drawing a distinction,
not between a surety and a guarantor, but between an
absolute and a conditional guaranty. A later case 8 cites
the earlier case with approval and holds that the "contract
of a guarantor is collat6ral and secondary and when he
guarantees the payment of a bond secured by collateral mort-
gage referred to in the bond he is not liable upon his guar-
anty until resort has been had to the mortgage, or to the
15 Thomas v. Cook, 8 B. & C. (Eng.) 728 (1828) ; Wildes v. Dudlow, L. R. 19 Ea.
(Eng.) 198 (1874); Faulkner et al v. Thomas et al, 48 W. Va. 148, 85 S. E. 916
(1900) ; contra Green v. Creswell, 10 A. & E. (Eng.) 458 (1839).
" Humphrey v. Hitt, 6 Gratt. 509 (1850), cited in a Monographic Note on Surety-
ship in 2 Rand. (Va. Rep. Ann.) 880.
17 Kearnes v. Montgomery, 4 W. Va. 29 (1870).
u Middle States Loan, Etc. Co. v. Engle, 45 W. Va. 588, 81 S. E. 921 (1898).
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bond, for the collection of the moneys secured, unless the
principal be insolvent, rendering further pursuit fruitless."
In what is apparently the latest case in point in West
Virginia19 the alleged surety was named in an agreement
of lease as a third party and signed the agreement, in
which he agreed "for a consideration deemed valuable to
him" that if the second party failed to pay the rental in
accordance with the terms of the agreement he, the third
party, would pay it. It was argued that the third party was
a surety, evidently because he had joined in the contract
with the principal, and according to text authority2o a surety
is one who joins in the contract of the principal and be-
comes an original party with the principal. But the court
held that since the alleged surety did not join in those por-
tions of the lease which imposed a primary obligation to
pay the rent, his agreement was not a primary undertak-
ing, but a promise to pay in case the principal should fail
to do so; that it was, therefore, "a conditional and collat-
eral agreement, defined in the law as a guaranty," and that
the guarantor could not be joined with the principal as a
defendant.
How to solve the problem of making the proper distinc-
tion in such cases is still a question. Perhaps the enactment
of statutes similar to those of Louisiana and Georgia is a
step in the right direction.
-E. H. Y.
' Shore v. Lawrence, supre, n. 10.
STEARNS ON SUnEuTYSp, 2nd Ed., 5.
WANTED.-Virginia Reports Annotated, volumes 1 to 74
inclusive; all West Virginia Reports and local practice books;
and good, up-to-date law-office equipment. Address West
Virginia Law Quarterly, Morgantown, W. Va.
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ADVERTISEMENTS
READY JANUARY 1, 1927
A TREATISE ON THE
Constitutional Limitations
UPON LEGISLATIVE POWER IN THE
SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION




of the Maryland Bar
Two volumes. 8vo. Law Buckram. Price $20.00, net, delivered.
For many years Cooley's Constitutional Limitations
has occupied an unique position with the Bench and Bar.
In this eighth edition the text of Judge Cooley has been
retained, with additions by the present editor enclosed in
brackets, for distinction. About 8,000 cases have been
added, and the new Constitutional amendments have
been thoroughly treated.
COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS sup-
plies practically a complete text book on the following
subjects:
Arrest; Assessments; Class Legislation; Conclusiveness of
Judgments; Constitutional Law; Construction of State Con-
stitutions; Construction of Statutes; Courts; Crimes; Di-
vorce; Due Process of Law; Elections; Eminent Domain;
* Extradition; Free Speech; Habeas Corpus; Judicial Pro-
e[ ceedings; Jury Trials; Legislature Powers; Legal Maxims;
Municipal Corporations, Charters, Assessments, and Ordi-
nances; Obligation of Contracts; Offices and Officers; Per-
* sonal Liberty; Police Power; Prohibition Laws; Privileged
Communications; Religious Liberty; Retroactive Legisla-
* tion; Schools; Searches and Seizures; Slander and Libel;
Suffrage; Taxation; Townships; Unconstitutional Law;
Vested Rights; Voters.
Citations are to the official reports, the Reporter Sys-
tem, U. S. L. edition, and to the several sets of selected
cases.
Little, Brown, & Company, Publishers
34 Beacon Street, Boston
Please mention Tan LAw QuAnTERLy when dealing with our Advertise=
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